Martti is right in saying that Kosovo (or Kosova) is a unique case. Whether that uniqueness justifies or requires special treatment for DXCC purposes is an entirely different question. Martti misrepresents the situation in a number of ways. First he says that in 1999 "from a U.N. point of view, Kosovo became non-Yugoslavia (now Serbia)." This is simply wrong. Security Council Resolution 1244 specifically recognized the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's (FRY) sovereignty and territorial integrity, and spoke of Kosovo only in terms of substantial autonomy and self-government within Yugoslavia. The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has an entirely different mandate than did the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which was established at about the same time. It is significant that UNTAET was given a call sign allocation, 4W, specifically for use in East Timor whereas UNMIK issues licenses (including YU8/OH2R) using a prefix allocated to Yugoslavia (and later, Serbia). Martti then says that the UN "outlined a roadmap for what was described as Kosovo's internationally supervised independence." What he is referring to is the "Ahtisaari Plan" which in fact deliberately does not use the word "independence" -- although a fair reading of the Plan is that that would be the eventual practical result, after a period of European Union (EU) supervision. However, the Ahtisaari Plan was not accepted by all parties and it is not, therefore, a "UN roadmap." By the way, it may be worth noting that Mr. Ahtisaari served as President of Finland from 1994 until 2000. In points 1 and 2 Martti argues that contacts with Kosovo after February 17, 2008 should not count as Serbia. However, as far as I am aware all licenses for operation from Kosovo bear callsigns with a Serbian prefix. It could be argued that using a YT or YU callsign is tantamount to acknowledging Serbian sovereignty. (The Serbs have muddied the water considerably by using YT8 and YU8 callsigns from Serbia proper, a practice that predates February 17 but that escalated considerably after that.) We assume that operations using Serbian callsigns are from Serbia; we do not ask to see copies of licenses before accrediting such operations. In any event, under the DXCC Rules February 17, 2008 cannot be the "Event Date" upon which Kosovo would become a New Entity; the February 17 date has no particular significance for DXCC purposes. Our saying so is not a political statement, but is simply the only conclusion one can reach from reading the DXCC rules. Finally, DXCC is not an instrument of US foreign policy. In point 3 he acknowledges that Kosovo does not meet established DXCC criteria and argues that it be treated as a special case. Kosovo is unique, but that does not make it a special case for DXCC purposes. The issue here is simply one of timing. In the recent case of Montenegro, Montenegro declared independence on June 3, 2006 and was admitted to UN membership on June 28, 2006. It was added to the DXCC list as of the latter date, in accordance with the DXCC rules. It did not receive an ITU callsign allocation until May 11, 2007. Whichever event -- UN membership or ITU callsign allocation -- occurred first would have triggered the addition to the DXCC list. June 3 was not a significant date for DXCC purposes. Martti is probably right when he says that Kosova's UN admission "will not materialize in the foreseeable future." However, that does not close the door to its being added to the DXCC list by virtue of a callsign allocation, if not to the Republic of Kosova then to an international supervisory body as in the case of East Timor. I'm not sure what Martti is driving at in points 4 and 5. In the case of Swains Island there was a wrong-headed effort to browbeat the ARRL into agreeing to cede responsibility for the representation of American Samoa in the IARU to a local group, solely to qualify Swains Island as a separate DXCC entity. This was an unintended consequence of a DXCC rule that made separate IARU membership a basis for being a DXCC entity. The ARRL Board rescinded the rule because of this abuse. Subsequently a way was found, and was agreed to by the DXAC, to write a rule so that Swains Island could be added without the negative consequences of the earlier rule. Since he has brought it up, let me add that an operation from Swains Island that occurred before the rules change does NOT count for DXCC; rules changes are not, and should not be, retroactive. Martti's point 6 assumes that a callsign allocation is not "on agenda." As discussed above, that is not necessarily the case. Martti accuses us of "rushing to act." The only reason we said anything at all about Kosovo was that members were asking questions about whether YU8/OH2R would count for a "new one." Reading the rules makes it clear that it would not. That's basically all we said, without specifically mentioning YU8/OH2R. In fact, there is no reason to rush. February 17 was not the end of the process for Kosovo, but was simply one step of many. There is widespread agreement that the best ultimate solution is for Kosovo and Serbia (along with the other parts of the former Yugoslavia) each to be part of an enlarged Europe. The challenge is how to get there, with as little bloodletting and as quickly as possible -- and unfortunately, there is not as much agreement on the "how" part. 73, Dave Sumner, K1ZZ